Studies (SAMS) studied Soviet operational art and its graduates incorporated these concepts into the force. AirLand Battle Doctrine (ALB) and AirLand Battle Future (ALBF) adapted much from Soviet operational thought as they prepared the students to combat a Soviet threat both operationally and tactically. OPFOR’s job was complicated further since many groups could buy equipment to counter or affect America's digitized Army. So, the OPFOR would constantly innovate and evolve to avoid being a predictable force. For example, the OPFOR might employ nontraditional communications such as cell phones and civilian radios - tactics befitting a technologically disadvantaged country like Krasnovia. As of 1997, today's OPFOR no longer fights scenarios with template Soviet maneuvers. Instead, the field manuals evolved into a capabilities-based approach to mirror current world situations. The SAMS directors shepherd OPFOR doctrine standardization using the former Soviet doctrine as a springboard. Modern adversaries are smarter than ever and therefore the team tries to reflect this with a free-thinking, adaptive OPFOR. For example, OPFOR action during training at the NTC is very close to opposition the Army saw in Iraq in 2003. This correlation held up in many areas, including: how troops flow into the theater of Krasnovia, how contractors are dealt with, how information nodes are established (to build and track combat power), and even details like how a car bomb would be used in Dust Bowl areas. OPFOR training at the NTC is as close a model to what happened in Iraq as exists.-COL Spartan
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